Transcript 0:04 There was still an office of sixty-seven people that did nothing but mobilization in ninety-three. There was much larger office of civil defense, and that was all completely wiped away. 0:12 At that point, again, I mentioned Larry Hall. He was that surviving member as a collateral duty. He eventually rebuilt the DPA office of FEMA to four people. 0:20 In the case of the voluntary agreement, which we really needed in March and April, but took us seven months to get it done because we needed the direct support of the attorney general himself. 0:28 And by the way, the last one that they did after the first Gulf War for military sea lift, that took seven years. It comes down to one question, and then everything comes from that. 0:38 Are we talking about emergency management? Are we talking about disaster relief? Hi, everyone, and welcome back to the Crisis Lab podcast. 0:48 I'm your host, Kyle, and today we have a fascinating episode that will challenge how we think about FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and its role in America's next big crisis. 0:57 Over the years, many of us have come to know FEMA as the organization that steps in after hurricanes, wildfires, and floods. But my guest, Quinn Lucy, offers a different perspective. 1:07 What if FEMA's real foundation was less about disaster relief and more about wartime mobilization and civil defense? 1:14 Now, in an era of looming polycrisis, or we might even say permacrisis these days, climate extremes, pandemics, and even geopolitical tensions, 1:24 Quinn argues that FEMA's older capacity for national resource coordination may be exactly what we need. 1:30 Yet he also questions whether FEMA is too focused on short-term disaster response as opposed to how we manage the next big war or protracted emergency. 1:39 So over the course of this episode, I'll play highlights from my conversation with Quinn and then unpack some of the implications. So could we really be ignoring the deeper meaning of emergency management? 1:49 And how might that affect us if we face a global pandemic plus a major geopolitical crisis simultaneously? So let's dive in and find out. 1:57 But of course, before we begin, just a quick reminder that any opinions expressed in this podcast are personal to the speakers and not reflective of any official government positions or agencies. 2:07 We're just doing this for the conversation and working to unpack some complex topics that face our society these days. 2:13 And so with that said, let's jump right into our first segment where Quinn shares how FEMA's real origin story looks nothing like you might expect. 2:21 Now, at the start, I asked Quinn to walk me through his two thousand nineteen article on how FEMA could lose America's next great war and what exactly motivated him to explore FEMA's history. 2:30 Rather than focusing on the day-to-day disaster relief, he stumbled upon what he calls the mobilization side, the older capacity to muster and direct national resources in a time of crisis. 2:41 And so let's hear this in Quinn's own words. So I wrote it in twenty nineteen, but it really goes back to my master's thesis at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security that I wrote around twenty eleven, twelve. 2:53 And so to actually start the thread, I was speaking with a very senior member of the White House during Katrina, and I was trying to figure out what to write my thesis on. 3:03 And he mentioned that President Bush had decided very early on, "I need to have someone in charge of the whole thing. So all three major states, I need a single federal representative." 3:12 And he says the lawyers, which I assume were the NSC or up in the White House, OGC said, "You can't do that." And I remember saying, "That's BS. Thank you for helping write my master's thesis." 3:23 So I wrote my master's thesis, Unity of Command for Federal Consequence Management, which was essentially the idea was the attorney general, Northcom commander, and whoever's designated as the federal coordinating officer in the Stafford Act, which does not have to come from FEMA, by the way. 3:35 It could be any federal official. 3:37 Between those three positions, you can have unity of command rather for federal response as opposed to unity of effort across the federal response, which of course is the way we've all been raised through the National Incident Management System and ICS, et cetera, because so much is based on federal state and also within the state having co-equal and peer partners. 3:56 But as part of that, back in twenty eleven, twenty twelve, I started reading these executive orders and things, and I saw all these references to wartime contingency planning or civil defense, or more importantly to what I do now, mobilization, which I didn't even really realize was a separate and sometimes overriding complementary program to civil defense, even though the perception is FEMA's roots are from civil defense, which I found out subsequently really isn't so much as true as the mobilization side, especially for emergency management. 4:26 So I'm reading all this stuff, and this is really fascinating. As you said, I've been a Marine judge advocate, and of course, the war is still going on pretty well still at that point in Afghanistan. 4:34 So I'm like, "This is interesting stuff." It was in the back of my mind until I taught at the Army War College in twenty sixteen, twenty seventeen. 4:40 And so when I left in twenty seventeen or as I was leaving, a couple big things were happening. One, North Korea was going nuclear. 4:47 And secondly, there were some exercises going on with Russia of what would happen if something happened. 4:55 Essentially, they would create an impenetrable SAM bubble so our planes couldn't get through, and their artillery, which shoots farther than ours, was just going to blow us back into Poland. So those weren't going well. 5:05 And I realized at that moment, I said, "That world is back. That world that I remember reading about five or six years ago, that's back." 5:12 And we don't have some of the advantages that we had even in the Cold War where outside of nuclear weapons, there weren't, wasn't a whole lot the Soviet Union could do to us domestically. 5:22 And so I spent my last month there really starting to dive into civil defense, and we didn't even realize at the time mobilization, which is essentially coordinating the nation's resources in a resource-constrained environment, pointing at a problem, in that case, preparing for a war in the Soviet Union. 5:39 But as I would learn subsequently as I read the executive orders, they were always dual use, which is one of the perceptions that people have. 5:46 It was only for military use, and it was never true, even back to the original Office for Emergency Management, nineteen forty. Very explicit. So I come back to my office. 5:56 Again, I was a lawyer at the time, so this is not reflective at all of the wider agency or certainly the people I spent the last several years working with and still have. 6:05 But my particular leadership, because of the cultural shift in the early ninetiesEssentially saw emergency management disaster relief as synonymous and were not, they were not friendly to the information I was digging up. 6:18 Eventually, running into that number of dead ends, I did what I had done previously at FEMA and went ahead and wrote an article. 6:25 So my first one was on creating a fraud program at FEMA, which was used to create a fraud program at FEMA. I had another one about the role of attorneys in FEMA in an operational organization. 6:35 That was the reason we have regional attorneys now, for instance, attorneys in NRCC in that program, which I helped start up. So really had an impact on the way that lawyers at FEMA work. 6:45 Wrote another one on how history goes round and round at FEMA, specifically how in Hurricane Sandy, it turns out we had, without any idea, completely replicated a number of programs down to the actual names from Hurricane Agnes in nineteen seventy-two under the Office for Emergency Preparedness. 7:00 Now imagine, as we were sitting there trying to figure out how to get electricity from the wire to the home, that there was actually an entire program that did exactly the same thing. 7:10 I think they called it Power to the People back then in nineteen seventy-two. And they even had a Operation Clean Sweep to do accelerated debris removal just as we were doing in twenty twelve. 7:20 It was absolutely amazing how much we replicated what we-- they'd come up with independently. And again, we had no ability to recall that and save all that time and effort. 7:31 So I had written several times before at FEMA, which luckily did not have any professional writing policy, I think, to this day, which is fun for someone like me. 7:40 And so in twenty nineteen, I went ahead and wrote that article, How FEMA Could Lose America's Next Great War. 7:45 And even though it says FEMA, I was never really talking about FEMA per se, but rather what FEMA used to represent, which was the emergency management, not necessarily disaster relief, but the emergency management locus within the federal government that has always existed since May of nineteen forty, and in some ways existed before that, in which even depending on which way the future of FEMA goes, there is always going to be a requirement for some kind of coordinating function across the federal government for crisis and to, again, pull that together and again, to help provide some umbrella for the states in certain circumstances. 8:27 So there are a number of functions related to the true meaning of emergency management that are not necessarily part of the disaster relief family. 8:36 So that's one of the strings I've been pulling really ever since I learned all that. So that's, that's very a three-minute version of how I ended up writing that article in twenty nineteen. 8:45 And since that time, it's gotten some publicity. I've been lecturing on it at the Eisenhower School since. 8:50 I was just at a big panel of over a thousand people on Monday on the future defense industrial base where I talked extensively about it, about the mobilization side, and we can talk about that more, about what do you do when you fight a conflict with a peer? 9:02 You don't do it with three to five percent of your economy. It's fifteen-- was thirteen percent in Korea, forty percent World War II. 9:08 That transition of the economy from the civilian to the military side is one of the core tenets of what emergency management truly is or was, and that's always been a civilian function. 9:17 So those are the kind of things as we get back into potentially planning that way, that even with FEMA going or not going, there's going to have to be a place somewhere in the federal government. 9:27 So anyway, yeah, that's the story of how I wrote the article and really I think where it started to take me afterwards. Now that's quite a revelation. 9:35 Many of us only see FEMA's involvement in domestic disasters, so stepping in with relief checks after wildfires or sending response teams to hurricanes. 9:43 But Quinn says FEMA's deeper roots were entwined with wartime mobilization, a mission less about giving grants and more about orchestrating the entire economy in a crisis. 9:53 And so let's put this into a little bit of context here. 9:55 So in nineteen forty, for example, Roosevelt recognized that a war in Europe could become America's concern, so the Office of Emergency Management existed to unify industrial output and civil defense. 10:06 And then in the nineteen fifties, the Cold War ramped up, and so civil defense programs evolved and told families to duck and cover while simultaneously the government tested how to shift factories to weapons production. 10:17 And so whether it was bombs or floods, emergency management meant coordinating across agencies, states, and the private industry. Now today, that broad concept is still around but can often feel quite alien. 10:31 We think of FEMA as trucks handing out water bottles or federal teams assisting states after a tornado and delivering federal assistance. But Quinn's research suggests it used to be about a far bigger scope. 10:43 And if you're listening and wondering why does this even matter, then consider how fragile modern supply chains proved to be during COVID-19. 10:49 A single crisis, a pandemic, can spawn ripple effects in global shipping, manufacturing, and health sectors, and we lived through this. Now imagine something even bigger involving potential conflict. 11:01 And that's exactly where these older frameworks like the Defense Production Act could come back into play. 11:08 So how did we go from this broad national security-driven emergency management to the FEMA that we know today, which is largely overwhelmed with disaster relief operations? 11:17 Now, Quinn shares some insights here, especially from the nineteen eighties and nineties when disaster relief became front and center. 11:23 Now, in this next segment, so Quinn explains that for about a decade after nineteen seventy-nine, FEMA was still heavily nationally security-oriented, and then events, these large-scale events like Hurricane Andrew, triggered a pivot toward what we now recognize as what we might call the modern FEMA. 11:39 So let's listen in here. All of that played into the creation of FEMA in nineteen seventy-nine. In fact, you can even go back, and I mentioned this I think in some of my article, Nifty Nugget nineteen seventy-eight. 11:51 So parallel to the creation of FEMA, very similar world to what we're in today. We're fighting an insurgency for well over a decade, changed the force to do that. 11:59 And in the late seventies in the Carter administration, at the same time as they're looking at disaster relief and emergency management, which specifically back then included mobilization civil defense. 12:08 They do this Nifty Nugget seventy-eight exercise. It's huge, it's a month long, SecDef is involved, and they realize, holy cow, we cannot fight a war in Europe. 12:17 We are-Basically, the president's gonna probably have two options. You can either start a nuclear war or you can lose Paris. 12:24 Although subsequently, we found out that maybe the French were gonna nuke the heck out of West Germany to make sure that they didn't cross the Rhine, but that's another story, right? 12:33 So anyway, starts under Carter, give them credit, carries over to Reagan, and I actually have the briefing they gave Reagan in '80 of, "Hey, we've got a problem here, sir. 12:42 We have this middle ground between nuclear conflict and kind of the low-level conflict that we're seeing now in the Cold War. 12:49 We got this middle ground, and if the Soviets figure it out, they may launch a war, and again, provide you, President Reagan, with two options, start a nuclear war or lose Western Europe," either of which are completely unacceptable to the president. 13:02 And so FEMA at this time, when you go back to Nifty Nugget in the after action, it literally says, we have all these issues on the civilian side, but they're all gonna be fixed because they're creating this brand-new agency called FEMA that's going to handle them. 13:15 And it's a really good data point to understand that FEMA was a national security agency in its first decade. I have the force laydown from '85 congressional justification. 13:23 It's almost an eight-to-one ratio of national security employees as there is dis-disaster relief. 13:28 Because again, we're still under the '74 act, and even though there's been changes, like it's a s-- the states still have a very large responsibility, and quite frankly, we weren't having the number of disasters and the size events that we have now and the level of development. 13:42 Just a simply smaller country. And that's, again, a whole other story of disaster relief that you could go down for another podcast. 13:48 But the bottom line is FEMA, the Emergency Management Agency for the United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, not the Federal Disaster Relief Agency, is primarily a national security agency in its first decade, and it is very much focused on helping DoD rebuild this middle ground to prepare for a potential conflict. 14:06 And again, with Able Archer in '83 and others, turned out a little closer than we thought to something kicking off. But that's the main focus of FEMA during that time period. 14:16 That starts to change finally, actually in the Bush administration in '88. 14:19 For instance, the MERS teams are, that we know of now are declassified, and the federal response plan, the direct res-- predecessor to the NRF, right, that is issued just in time for the first Gulf War, which is, by the way, the last time we fought a war with an actual civilian mobilization system behind it. 14:35 But there's a lot of focus. Again, it's a national security agency. I have General Becton's mission statement for FEMA from the mid-'80s. That was its focus, but we also find that disaster relief is still important. 14:47 We have a growing office for that. And of course, the modern FEMA all arises at the beginning of the Carter administration. 14:54 So at the end of Bush administration, Hurricane Andrew hits, and I actually write about this a lot in my master's thesis. You can cut and paste Andrew and Katrina. The same issues, the same problems. 15:06 I've-- to this day, I'm still surprised that no one brought up Andrew more considering it was only thirteen years before Katrina. But it's a mess. Stickney gets sidelined. They bring in, I think, John Sununu to run it. 15:19 Bush does. Obviously, perception of the country is it didn't go well. So James Lee Witt comes, right, who is the first emergency manager to, to run. 15:28 And he essentially, the FEMA we have today is a direct result of the changes he made. 15:32 And again, that's, that is now the culture of FEMA that I arrived in two thousand-- beginning of two thousand and six, and the one that for the most part exists today, although I think there have been a lot of changes in the last few years. 15:44 But that's when FEMA transitioned from a national security agency fully to one that did disaster relief, regional natural hazards and specifically. And of course, did a fantastic job, project mitigation. 15:56 There was a lot of things, not just response, not just recovery, but a lot of good things that were done, but he completely refocused that whole system essentially on regional natural hazards, which is the FEMA that we have today, whether it's EMI doing stuff on the very, very front end, whether it's mitigation programs. 16:12 If you look at the federal mitigation, uh, framework, it's not about mitigating everything. It's about mitigating wind and water, essentially. That is the department, that is the agency that we got. 16:22 And of course, it was an independent agency for a time, like its predecessors way back in the national security era, which the real reason FEMA was on the NSC was not because of disaster relief. 16:33 And I think this is an important thing for people to understand. It's not a comfortable one for a lot of people. It wasn't there for disaster relief. 16:39 It was there because of its national security responsibility, specifically for national mobilization, directing the nation's resources. 16:46 The FEMA director and his predecessors in a war under the plans that I have, um, would have been responsible for the nation's resources, much like the Jimmy Byrnes position in nineteen forty-three, where he was assistant president. 16:57 That's why FEMA was on NSC, not disaster relief. And then we have the modern era everybody's familiar. We have Bush administration comes in two thousand. There's a change. Brown, Katrina doesn't go well. 17:08 We have the camera. FEMA has its position within DHS, which is specifically created on the model of the Coast Guard. 17:14 They have some great four debate from Trent Lott, where essentially Trent Lott, Hillary Clinton, and Joe Lieberman basically made FEMA's position in DHS the way it is now, specifically based on the Coast Guard's role of you're in DHS, but there are only things that the Coast Guard and FEMA can do that the DHS secretary can't touch. 17:33 And then you roll into essentially Sandy and everything else. So you can hear how disasters began dominating FEMA's culture, especially once James Lee Witt reorganized it in the nineteen nineties. 17:45 Public outcry after Andrew and Katrina essentially forced FEMA to prove it could handle major storms. And to be fair, FEMA improved significantly at that specific job. 17:56 But in Quinn's view, the old civil defense powers, like swiftly converting factories to produce ventilators or orchestrating mass evacuations if a nuclear threat arises, fell by the wayside in turn. 18:07 And so think about the implications really, because on one hand, focusing on hurricanes and floods is sensible because it is the daily threat that we live with within many states, and recent storms are even showing this in twenty twenty-five.The agency must handle that as well. 18:23 And on the other hand, a crisis like the pandemic showed that large-scale emergencies can quickly outstrip normal supply lines. Governors scramble for PPE, for example. 18:32 States bid against each other in competition for supplies. And without a robust national mobilization framework, we lack a unifying method to allocate critical goods and even services. 18:44 And so this tension resonates with a key theme in governance, especially during a crisis, which is balancing localized solutions for routine events, the day-to-day things and the seasons we live through, versus a centralized approach for systemic large-scale threats. 18:57 And as Quinn puts it, if we face something bigger than a category five hurricane, like a multi-year pandemic with global supply chain breakdown or even an actual conflict with a peer nation, who coordinates the entire economy and civil society? 19:11 If FEMA doesn't, do we invent a new agency or do we revert to older models that we have long forgotten? So our next segment zeroes in on a prime example of resource constraints, which is from the pandemic. 19:25 Quinn explains how the pandemic forced a scramble reminiscent of old civil defense days, except the frameworks had mostly disappeared. Now, here Quinn reflects on his own experience. 19:35 He says he helped set up a voluntary agreement under the Defense Production Act for the first time in decades, and let's hear how that went and unpack that just a little bit. 19:46 And I will say, I think the change to where we are now really began in COVID. I was supply chain task force working directly for Raymond Podlichuk. I wrote the first voluntary agreement in 19:55 thirty years, the second one in, gosh, we don't even know, fifty, sixty years, who knows. But we started to realize, at least I did, wow, 20:04 why did we get rid of a lot of those dual use national security requirements to focus the nation on a problem, specifically for national resource management? 20:12 Boy, it would have been really incredibly helpful to have those in place in February and March of twenty twenty and not recreating them, like in the case of the voluntary agreement, which we really needed in March and April, but took us seven months to get it done because we needed direct support of the attorney general himself. 20:29 And by the way, the last one that they did after the first Gulf War for military sea lift, that took seven years. So there were a lot of things, including the DPA being more efficient at that and understanding as well. 20:42 It would have been fascinating. Again, going back to that transition, there was still an office of sixty-seven people that did nothing but mobilization in ninety-three. 20:49 There was much larger office of civil defense, and that was all completely wiped away. At that point, again, I mentioned Larry Hall. He was that surviving member, was a collateral duty. 20:57 He eventually rebuilt the DPA office at FEMA to four people, which was the size it was when throughout that time period. I think even when it was being run in COVID, I think it was still four to six. 21:09 Now Abe Gun has got that office to maybe a dozen. But again, just barely large enough to handle the DPA. 21:15 This idea of being able to, quite frankly, the FEMA, sorry, I've talked so long, but the FEMA of nineteen eighty looks a lot more like CISA potentially now with the National Resource Management Center and these other things than FEMA does, looks like its version of nineteen eighty. 21:28 And so all that is wiped away, and I think in COVID was the first time we realized, boy, maybe it would have been really good to have kept some of those things. 21:36 And that finally gets onto our current era, obviously, the, the war on Ukraine, the rise of China, and it's the specific guidance that we have now been told off the source that they are looking at twenty-seven and twenty-eight to have options available to Xi Jinping. 21:50 We're now back into a multipolar world. One of my friends at FEMA, Brian Applebee, called it a strategic pause. I always like to give him credit for that. I thought it was a really great way to say it. That era is over. 22:00 And so I think we are in a good place, even if disaster relief is shortly probably driving the train on what FEMA will look like in the future. 22:08 I think we're in a really good place to really talk about, are we really talking about disaster relief, or are we talking about emergency management, which is essentially everything I've been talking about for the last several minutes, which is much broader and larger in that even if the federal government says, we are out of long-term disaster relief, we're gonna only go back to that nineteen fiftys version of response only and very short-term help. 22:30 These emergency management requirements to focus and coordinate across the USG in a crisis, national security emergency is one of the executive orders calls it. Like, those things are never going away. 22:41 You can get rid of them tomorrow, but in two, two days, two weeks, two years, you're gonna realize, boy, we got to have a place in the federal government somewhere for that. 22:50 So I talked a lot, but that is essentially as I know it and been able to learn the history of FEMA from nineteen forty all the way up to twenty twenty-five. 23:03 Now, to me, Quinn's story underscores a core tension in modern crisis management, which is really what do we do when the entire system is strained, or even when the entire system is failing? 23:14 We're used to local and state agencies asking for federal help from FEMA and other organizations and even mutual aid. 23:20 But in a truly national scale event, like a pandemic that goes across all fifty states at once, there's a finite supply of, for example, ventilators or protective gear. 23:31 The old civil defense approach had ways to allocate scarce resources. Today, we mostly rely on the market or ad hoc deals. The pandemic times taught us how messy that can become. 23:43 Now, this challenge extends beyond PPE, of course. 23:45 Pi-picture an earthquake, for example, that devastates a major region, or a multi-state wildfire scenario, or consider a peer conflict scenario that disrupts major shipping routes, and we've seen this with the Red Sea events in recent months. 23:59 Now, we might discover we can't simply order more stuff. We face a supply shortfall. 24:04 Now, Quinn argues that's when the older version of emergency management and those tools like the DPA or a robust mobilization staff become invaluable. 24:15 Now, what's striking is how he says it took months to implement a single voluntary agreement. In a crisis, months can be the difference between relative stability and chaos. 24:24 Now, historically, the US overcame a big crisis like, you know, the World War II mobilization because we had advanced planning, bureaucratic structures, and legislative frameworks. 24:31 And over time-And we have let those structures gather dust or even just fade away completely, assuming we wouldn't need them for anything short of a nuclear war. 24:40 And then along comes a pandemic to show us that resource constraints are no longer hypothetical. Now, from a governance standpoint that suggests we need a consistent strategy for large-scale resource coordination. 24:52 If not FEMA, then some other entity must do it. Should it be the Department of Homeland Security, or do we recreate a, quote, Office of Emergency Management like in the nineteen-forties? 25:03 Now, ultimately, it's a policy question that merges local, state, federal, and private interests, and the answer could shape the next catastrophic response. Now, given all this, how do we define FEMA's future? 25:16 Is it primarily a disaster relief agency, or does it revert to a broader emergency management approach? Now let's listen as Quinn spells out the dilemma and calls for a deeper conversation about the agency's mission. 25:28 And in this final clip, Quinn puts the question quite plainly. Is FEMA essentially a response and relief agency, or is it meant to coordinate the entire nation under a crisis? 25:42 In that space, I think it comes down to one question, and then everything comes from that. Are we talking about emergency management? Are we talking about disaster relief? 25:52 The council, and again, whatever executive order comes out on Monday, which seems like it's focused on disaster relief, they have to decide that fundamental question. How are we approaching this? 26:01 Is it emergency management, which as I mentioned, it pulls in a whole lot of stuff. And quite frankly, some of that stuff, even to get rid of it tomorrow, eventually you're going to need it again. 26:10 It's just the way the world works. It's just a fundamental question of having a government. Or is it disaster relief, which of course is, again, that's driving the ship, right? That's the response of Lean and others. 26:21 Clearly, there's unhappiness. 26:22 And I'm actually very positive about that because again, the last time we looked at disaster relief at that point, not really emergency management, disaster relief was in nineteen eighty-eight. 26:31 We haven't had fundamental hearings on the role of the federal government and how disaster relief should look since nineteen eighty-eight. We've had discussions in two thousand. 26:39 We had discussions after Katrina, but we were, Katrina is an example of FEMA's broken. We got to fix it. But there was never a discussion about, wait a minute. 26:48 Was the mix right between the federal government and the state? You know, it was just assumed that the federal government had to be doing more and there wasn't competent things going on, and we have to fix that. 26:58 It was just assumed. I think the value here is hopefully we can have a really constructive conversation going back to the roots of, again, really start in nineteen fifty. There's a model from there. 27:08 There's a model that grew up post nineteen seventy. There's a model even post nineteen eighty-eight, and we didn't even talk about it. 27:14 But when FEMA tried to make objective standards for disasters declarations and Congress revolted, a lot of that was led by Tom Ridge himself, had a lot to do with the Stafford Act. 27:23 He's really the father of that nineteen eighty-eight agreement. But they specifically put in, in Section three twenty Stafford Act to basically stop objective standards, right? 27:31 And so of course, only the president, and again, honestly, this would be something I think would be good to be brought up in that conversation. 27:37 I get it from a political standpoint, but every disaster declaration, I used to teach this in my class, I'd say, going back to Truman in nineteen fifty, 27:44 how many disaster declarations under disaster relief authorities statutes since then, how many have been approved or denied by the president and by FEMA's predecessors? 27:54 And the, and when it comes to FEMA's predecessors, the answer is zero. No president has ever delegated that. 27:59 But yet politically, and I understand why, we all do, it's approved, comes from the president, it's denied, comes from FEMA. But only the president can approve or deny a disaster declaration. 28:10 And the president cannot, and FEMA cannot set objective standards essentially because of that, that hearing in nineteen eighty-six that led to the, to that particular part of Section three twenty. 28:22 Again, that was a decision made in that political environment. That would be maybe something very interesting for this council to approach and say, "Is that still the right approach?" 28:31 Do we wait, wait, start to have these things come from the presidency because it just provides more clarity to people who's making the decision. 28:38 Again, I understand why that's not the easiest thing for any president or any party, right? I get that. But maybe the long-term effects of that isn't positive American people, right? 28:48 They're not really understanding what's going on. Maybe we do need to have some objective standards. 28:53 This disaster deductible whole side story that came up in, under Fugate, that actually came from a blog post I wrote that the Democratic administration at the time was not happy with, but I pointed this stuff out. 29:03 And so now, you know, there are no objective standards. That's the way Congress created in nineteen eighty-eight, specifically wanted it set up that way. 29:10 That might be a really good conversation to have and say, "Is that the right way forward?" Maybe it is. Maybe politically across the spectrum, that's just the way you have to go forward from the federal government. 29:20 And if that's true, totally understand it, move on. But I think it's just a good... 29:24 That's just one example, one of the detailed things I think this council could really dive into, but it all goes back to that fundamental question. Are we talking about emergency management? 29:33 Are we talking disaster relief? And depending on how that council looks at this, um, which of course is co-chaired by the Department of Defense, 29:41 I think once they decide on that fundamental fact, that will decide the path as council goes down. 29:47 And then ultimately, again, we'll see this EO on Monday, the future of literally the Federal Man- Emergency Management Agency. But as I said, the idea of emergency management, like 29:57 those requirements will always have a home in the federal government and the state and local level. That's a side story. But again, is it emergency management or is it disaster relief? 30:08 Now, this is the crux of Quinn's argument. Do we want a federal disaster relief agency or a true federal emergency management agency? 30:16 And the question matters for future crisis because of scope, authority, and politics, and of course, public perception. 30:23 So in terms of scope, a pure disaster relief organization focuses on addressing typical floods, wildfires, and hurricanes. It's vital, and that's really not a question. 30:33 But a bigger crisis, say a pandemic plus a major war, demands something else, large-scale coordination of every facet-Of our society from industrial capacity to national logistics. And then we have authority. 30:45 If FEMA's only recognized authority is handing out recovery grants or grant mechanisms, it lacks the credibility or legal framework to do national level resource triage. 30:55 The Defense Production Act is rarely used comprehensively, and yet that's exactly the tool that might be needed if we had to, for instance, produce millions of doses of a new vaccine while shipping essential supplies overseas for a conflict and supporting an allied nation. 31:10 And of course, there's always the politics and public perception. 31:13 And politically, it's easier for FEMA to be a relief organization that resonates with the average voter who sees these types of storms every year and their community is always impacted. 31:23 And meanwhile, mobilization for war or pandemics is more abstract until a crisis hits. And then we scramble. So listening to Quinn, we also sense that an entire cultural shift is happening and might be required. 31:38 Over decades, the American public got used to local volunteerism plus federal support and relief in a crisis. 31:44 Real mobilization with an event large enough at a scale enough might mean federal direction, mandated production quotas or major supply chain oversight, things that many in the U.S. reflexively resist. 31:56 So any pivot to a bigger, broader, quote, emergency management might face pushback unless leaders communicate why this is actually necessary. 32:06 Now, during World War II, the War Production Board and other offices orchestrated the economy at an unprecedented level with widespread public support. 32:14 That acceptance came because Americans felt this type of existential threat and they were invested in the outcomes. 32:20 Now, Quinn's argument suggests that if we face a 21st century existential threat, we'll need something akin to those World War II types of frameworks and we can't simply just build them overnight. 32:32 Now, if we keep ignoring that side of the mission, we risk confusion in a real crisis. This is, at its core, a question of governance. 32:40 And in the course of everyday disasters, FEMA has been sufficient and that is largely in question now these days. But in an extraordinary scenario, we might discover that we're actually missing half the puzzle. 32:54 Now, Quinn and I spoke for an extended period of time and given everything that we've heard, I just wanted to sort of take a step back and consider how this ties into broader crisis management and then largely about how we govern during a crisis. 33:06 And there's a few key points here that I want to get through and the first of which is multi-level governance. And so Quinn's remarks highlighted a tension between federal, state and local authorities. 33:13 Now, in typical disasters, you know, states request federal aid, but in a massive crisis, every state is claiming for the same resources. And so without a robust national system, we get disjointed efforts. 33:23 The next crisis might require a nationwide plan. And the question is, who is going to enforce that? 33:28 And if we really want to talk about policy reform, which is the next point, if we want FEMA to regain a, quote, wartime mobilization approach, that might mean rewriting laws or reactivating old authorities. 33:40 For example, clarifying the circumstances under which FEMA can override state procurement or how it can direct private industry. 33:47 Political leaders must debate this openly because it's a major shift in how we handle emergencies. And we might see some of that out of the recent conversations around FEMA and its mission. 33:57 But that really takes us to public communication and trust, which is the third point, because as with any sweeping policy, there's a trust factor. 34:04 The public needs to understand why FEMA would coordinate a big crisis rather than leaving it to the states or to the market. 34:11 If we don't build that trust pre-crisis, attempts at federal direction might face intense resistance in the moment, as we saw with some states during COVID or even after recent hurricanes and what has brought FEMA into the recent spotlight in the last year or so. 34:28 And then we have, of course, the, quote, all hazards approach versus niche missions. Now, historically, all hazards means you plan for everything from floods to nuclear war. 34:36 But in practice, many agencies drift into specialized pockets. Quinn calls for returning to truly integrated approach that might help with the lesser known threats like extreme cyber disruptions or repeated pandemics. 34:49 But it's a heavy lift. No single agency can do everything without strong interagency ties. And that really brings us into the fifth point, which is potential models. 34:59 Could FEMA be split into two parts, for example, one for routine disasters, quote unquote, and the other for mobilization efforts, large scale complex crisis? 35:10 Or should we just resurrect something like the old Office of Emergency Management in the White House for cross departmental coordination? Either approach demands robust collaboration and legal clarity. 35:21 Now, finally, let's recall that a crisis and complex crisis. Well, actually, they're just becoming more complex these days. 35:28 And so, you know, natural hazards intersect with health emergencies and supply chain breakdowns and possible security issues. 35:34 And this era of polycrisis is now transitioning into what we call permacrisis, where it's just something every day consistently. And we're always responding and always recovering. 35:44 And this type of environment demands a more flexible, broad based FEMA. But without it, we rely on ad hoc measures each time. 35:53 And so the political question, as Quinn points out, is whether we have the will to do so before the next complex crisis or if we will only fix the things after we're already in the midst of it. 36:06 And that brings us to the end of our discussion with Quinn Lucy. 36:08 I hope this journey through FEMA's often overlooked national security origins, plus its pivot towards disaster relief, sparks some new thinking about how we collectively handle emergencies. 36:17 And so there's three sort of key final points I'll make before we conclude. And that FEMA was just never about relief. 36:23 It began as a broad based emergency management entity, coordinating everything from war mobilization to civil defense. 36:28 And over time, with the growth and frequency and cost of disasters, that mission has largely become overwhelmed by relief operations. And we are now in a constant state of recovery as a society. 36:39 And so the pandemic, the pandemic itself was really a wake up call because we lack robust resource mobilization tools. We built them on the fly, losing valuable time. 36:48 And for an even bigger, more complex crisis, even those with national security implications, that approach simply will not cut it. And so the future of FEMA is really a policy choice and it is a governance choice. 36:59 So do we want full spectrum all hazards coordination, including potential conflict and resource coordination and mobilization at a central government level? Or do we remain a specialized disaster relief agency? 37:11 Both approaches have their own implications for governance, states rights and private industry. 37:16 And so just consider all that as all of these policy discussions are happening this year in terms of what is happening with FEMA and where our future actually lies. 37:24 We know a couple of things really for sure is that FEMA is under scrutiny. And number two, that a crisis and emergencies and disasters are ultimately getting more frequent, more complex and more interconnected. 37:35 And that's all for today's episode of the Crisis Lab podcast. While you're here, do me a quick favor and help us grow. 37:39 Share this episode with colleagues or friends working in emergency management, policymaking or governance or anyone curious about how we manage the next complex crisis. 37:47 And while you're doing that, give us a like as well. I'd really appreciate it. A huge thanks to Quinn Lucy for taking time to share his thoughts. And thank you, our listeners, for joining us on the Crisis Lab podcast. 37:55 Until next time, I'm Kyle and wishing you a safe and thoughtful week.